As originally planned, the Energy Sector
Levies Act (ESLA) was introduced to insulate the financial sector from
legacy debt in the energy sector and help bolster the real sector of the
economy – which the Akufo-Addo government must stick to, former Finance
Minister, Seth Terkper has said.
Speaking to the B&FT during a
telephone conversation on a wide range of financial sector issues, Mr.
Terkper said: “The ESLA and refinancing of VRA’s legacy debt was a
pragmatic way of preventing impacts of the energy and road sector debt
from contagiously affecting depositors’ funds, jobs and causing a
meltdown of the Ghanaian economy – which in 2015 was just emerging from
the energy crisis caused by damage of the West Africa gas pipeline and
disruption in gas supply from Nigeria”.
The ESLA, he said, was a tripartite agreement that improved the Non-Performing Loans (NPL) situation in 12 domestic banks.
However, he noted: “We are seeing the
contrast in allowing some banks to fall and others forced into a
consolidation programme. Big is not always beautiful in this context,
because the global financial crisis also coined the term “too big to
fail”, when it came to the question of allowing bigger banks than Lehman
Brothers to also fall.
Already, he argued, the fiscal cost in
the form of levies (ESLA) and loans has been heavy, while the impact on
the real sector from job losses is also real.
“Given the strong ESLA inflows, we still
have an opportunity to redirect the levy to the core business of
resolving the real and financial crisis,” said Mr. Terkper, who has not
been shy of letting his views on the economy be known since leaving
office in December 2016.
“We can do this by removing impediments
such as the ESLA ‘cap’ and mainstreaming its flows, to focus better on
the NPLs emanating from the energy, road and other sectors. The banking
sector also needs the ESLA inflows, and therefore we must revert to
paying principal plus interest for all ESLA-backed loans or bonds,” he
said.
The ESLA, Mr. Terkper said, is a crisis
resolution tool for State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), Non-Performing Loans
(NPLs) and arrears to suppliers such as the N-Gas, Sunon-Asogli. It was
also to be used for improvement in rural
electrification and public lighting; stabilisation of petrol pump
prices; an enhanced levy for the Road Fund to clear arrears to
contractors and counterpart banks.
The Act was a “smart-borrowing”
initiative under the Home-Grown Policies that Cabinet and Parliament
approved in the 2013 and 2014 Budgets, he said.
According to Mr. Terkper, the Finance
Ministry setting up ESLA plc in 2017 as a quasi-fiscal agency “seems to
compromise the non-classification of SOE debt as public debt”, and in
contrast the innovative 2015 ESLA mechanism ‘ringfences’ the inflows to
pay debt on SOE balance sheets — through a mandatory “escrow” or debt
service account (DSA).
This, he said, was to avoid the ‘bullet’
risk associated with the 2007 Sovereign Bond and use of the Sinking Fund
to pay over US$500million of petroleum revenue between 2014 and 2017 to
redeem the maturing US$750million debt.
He said there exists a potential to use
the ESLA Act, 2015 [Act 899]) to substantially resolve the ongoing
banking or financial sector crisis.
The ESLA, he said, is to among other
things ensure the financial viability of energy-sector State-Owned
Enterprises (SOEs), facilitate investments in the sector; and mitigate
against market, credit and liquidity risks of energy sector SOES and
their counterpart creditor banks.
“The 2017 ESLA report repeats the goal of
using ESLA for leveraging the markets to resolve the adverse direct and
indirect impacts of debt to creditors and counterpart banks.
“The debt overhang also increased the
exposure of those institutions to credit and liquidity risk, and
consequently impacted significantly on the balance sheets of their
counterpart creditor banks. To address these challenges, government
passed the ESLA in December 2015 – with full implementation beginning in
2016,” Mr. Terkper explained.
Below is the full article by Seth E. Terkper, Immediate Past Minister for Finance
This article discusses the potential of using ESLA (Energy Sector Levies Act, 2015 [Act 899]) to substantially resolve the ongoing banking or financial sector crisis. The Act was a “smart-borrowing” initiative under the Home–Grown Policies that Cabinet and Parliament approved inthe 2013 and 2014 Budgets. We note that ESLA was not among the measures under 2014 IMF Enhance Credit Facility (ECF) Agreement.
The relevance to the financial crisis is clear from the Ministry of Finance (MOF) 2016 report sent to Parliament in 2017—Annual Report on the Management of the Energy Sector Levies and Accounts (Years 2016)—which notes the objectives of ESLA as follows:
“The Act (i) consolidates existing
Energy Sector Levies and defines a framework to correct imbalances in
the collection, distribution, and utilization of the levies; (iii) ensures the financial viability of energy sector State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs);
(iv) facilitate investments in the sector; and (v) mitigate against
market, credit and liquidity risks of energy sector SOES and their counterpart creditor banks” (par. 2, p 6; emphasis added).
The 2017 ESLA report repeats the goal of using ESLA to leverage the markets to resolve the adverse direct and indirect impact of debt to creditors and counterpart banks.
“The debt overhang also increased the exposure of those institutions to credit and liquidity risk and, consequently, impacted significantly on the balance sheets of their counterpart creditor banks. To address these challenges, Government passed the ESLA in December 2015, with full implementation beginning in 2016” (see also Par. 70 to 72).
ESLA is a crisis resolution tool for SOE non-performing loans (NPLs) and arrears to suppliers (e.g., N-Gas, Sunon–Asogli); improvement in rural electrification and public lighting;stabilization of petrol pump prices; an enhanced levy for the Road Fund to clear arrears to contractors and counterpart banks. MOF’s setting up of ESLA plc in 2017 as a quasi-fiscal agency seems to compromise the non-classification of SOE debt as public debt. In contrast, the innovative 2015 ESLA mechanism “ring-fences” the inflows to pay debt on SOE balance sheets—through a mandatory “escrow” or debt service account (DSA).
1. FLOWS AND USES OF ESLA IN 2016
In early 2016, MOF used the actual and estimated ESLA flows, in a “cascade” model, to pay US$250 million cash and restructure of GHc2.2 billion of debt on VRA’s Balance Sheet. The successful model uses the “ring-fenced” DSA flows to pay the banks directly, to settle NPLs due from VRA, TOR and BDCs.
1.1 Strong ESLA inflows: As the Tables in Section 5 show, about Ghc 2 billion of the total annual ESLA flows are dedicated to settling energy and road sector debt. It was possible to use these funds to ease the pressures facing the banking sector without further loans.
1.2 “Cascade model” helpful to banking sector: The model uses ESLA flows meant to (a) paydebt to creditors and banks; under (b) a tripartite agreement with government to (c) use the “ring-fenced” flows in “escrow” accounts to settle NPLs due counterpart banks.
1.3 Successful resolution of SOE and other debt in FY2016. The ESLA “cascade” debt resolution model was used in 2016 as follows:
• VRA debt: With payment of Ghc250 million upfront, MOF successfully restructuredGhc2.2 billion of VRA debt owed to 12 domestic banks—paying both principal and interest in five (5) years. By end-2016, MOF had paid two quarterly instalments of Ghc228 million.
• Road arrears: The enhanced [ESLA] road levy was used to restructure over Ghc 1 billion of Road Fund debt to contractors and creditors, including a loan due to SSNITsince 2010.
• TOR and BDC debt: the ESLA TOR levies for debt recovery and price stabilization were used to restructure over Ghc 1 billion of Tema Oil Refinery (TOR) and Bulk Distribution Company (BDC) debt.
1.4 Strategic stock initiative: this initiative supported the liberalization of fuel-pump prices, with MOF releasing nearly GhC190 million to the Bulk Oil Storage and Transit (BOST) company to (a) buy fuel for storage at low crude oil price points; and (b) releasing it at a reasonable margin for re-export or domestic use when prices increase.
1.5 Draft AFRIEXEM Term Sheet: At end–2016, MOF had the final draft of a Term Sheet negotiated with a consortium of banks led by AFRIEXIM Bank. The US$600 million loan with 5-year tenor and 8 percent interest rate was for restructuring additional VRA and other energy–SOE debt due to suppliers such as N-Gas and Sunon-Asogli.
2. ESLA PERFORMANCE IN 2017
New administrations take time on existing policies but the Parliamentary debate of ESLAled to an Opposition boycott of the “nuisance tax”, with a sluggish take off in 2017.
2.1 Delays in FY 2017 worsened the situation: The 2016 draft AFRIEXIM facility was set aside, with MOF choosing to make piecemeal payments. this delayed the restructuring of US$600 million of debt owing to creditors and counterpart banks.
2.2 ESLA extension for 10 years means more inflows. The 2017 ESLA Bond implies a levy extension for 7-to-10 years—compared with 5 years for the 2016 VRA facility. At an annual flow of GHc 3.2 billion, ESLA could generate over Ghc30 billion to support the estimated US$ 8 billion facility needed to resolve the banking crisis.
2.3 FY 2017 (Interest-only) Bond reintroduces risks: The “principal-plus-interest” 2016 VRA debt resolution is subsumed in a riskier “interest-only” 2017 ESLA Bond.
• Liquidity risk: the longer tenor and interest-only payment means less inflows to the banks and inevitable BOG “fiscalization” of huge financial costs.
• Bullet and roll-over risks: the payment of principal as a “bullet” in 7 or 10 years implies a major “roll-over” risk, devoid of “smart-borrowing” schemes like a Sinking Fund and Buy-Back.
• Interest and forex risks: the 2017 ESLA Bonds converted the 8 percent 2016 VRAdollar loan—under a “swap” of existing VRA $-debt service flows—into a 19 percent cedi-loan. This increases interest and forex risks under a depreciating cedi scenario.
Ghana had used “soft amortization” structures to minimize roll-over risks for its external bonds, with the 2023 Sovereign Bond being the only “bullet” of 4 Bonds at end-2016.
2.4 ESLA subject to FY2017 Budget “cap”: The “capping” of various statutory funds such as DACF, GETFund and NHIL is extended to ESLA. The 2017 ESLA Report (par. 41) states:
“…
a shortfall in lodgment of GCc306 million (21.1 percent) was recorded,
as a result of …. Government policy on “capping” statutory funds, which reduced transfers into the Road and Energy Fund Accounts by GHc 157.23 million”.
Clearly, national policy makes ESLA secondary to schemes such as F-SHS, whereas an alignment to pay creditors in the banking, energy, and road sectors would have improved the fortunes of the financial and real sectors.
2.5 ESLA as mainstream revenue: Besides the “ring-fenced” debt-service amount, the 2016Budget/Mid-Year treated some of the ESLA flows as mainstream revenue since they accrued to agencies such as Energy Board that were on central government budget. The “cap” raised these transfers from GHc … million in 2016 to GHc …. million in 2017.
2.6 Strategic Stocks and BOST refund: The 2016 ESLA report notes that MOF released GhC189.39 million to BOST to start the strategic oil stocks scheme (par. 34, p 14), as alternative to subsidy payments. However, the 2017 ESLA Report notes:
“An amount of Ghc189.39 million was transferred to BOST … for the procurement of strategic oil stock in 2016 … As at end-December 2017, BOST had refunded Ghc120 million … leaving an outstanding balance of GHc69.39 million” (par. 45, p 25).
The quote is curious since the amount was to create a revolving fund for managing stocks, prices and subsidy—a primary reason for the SOE debt ESLA levies. It is not a traditional loan to be refunded.
2.7 Payments outside ESLA legislation: The 2017 ESLA and other reports show ESLAproceeds being used to pay (a) pension arrears [NPRA TPFA] of GHc600 million and (b) Partial Risk Guarantee (PRG) of GHc61.5 million. These were not part of the “legacy” debt in the 2015 ESLA Memorandum. The PRG also suggests ECG inability to pay for the SANKOFA “gas-to-energy” Letter of Credit (LC) waterfall payment arrangements.
2.8 ESLA plc and exposure to public debt: SOEs are profit-making entities whose debt is not co-mingled with the public debt. ESLA simply viewed the statutory levy as merelyimproving the probability of payment. Though quasi-fiscal agency, ESLA plc must not resemble a guarantee institution instead of being managers.
3. RESTRUCTURING SOE AND COUNTERPART BANK DEBTS
In 2016, MOF successfully negotiated a facility to refinance Ghc 2.2 billion of loans owed by VRA to twelve (12) domestic banks, led by the President of the Association of Bankers. Table 1 shows extracts from the Sheet as follows:
Table 1: Restructuring Agreement (2016) with 12 Banks
|
Item
|
Amount (million)
|
Rate (%)
|
Period (years)
|
Comments
|
|
Ghc (million) component
|
||||
|
Loan amount
|
Ghc 765.0
|
25
|
5
|
Flexible rate pegged to T-Bill rate
|
|
US$ (million) component
|
||||
|
Loan amount
|
US$ 357.0
|
8
|
5
|
Fixed rate
|
|
Common elements
|
||||
|
Estimated VRA debt
|
Ghc 4,200.0
|
|
|
Foreign component x-rate of
|
|
1st restructuring amt
|
2,200.0
|
|
|
|
|
Upfront payment
|
Ghc 250.0
|
|
|
Paid from the 1st ESLA flows
|
|
Repayment period
|
|
|
5
|
|
|
Instalments
|
Ghc 228.8
|
|
|
2 quarterly instalments (end-2016)
|
A second term sheet was handed over during the 2016 Election Transition process forrefinancing debt owed to banks and suppliers. The US$600 million loan from an AFRIEXIM-led consortium of six (6) banks was repayable at 8 percent in five (5) years. It was not utilized and replaced with the ESLA plc bonds in August 2017 (Table 2), including a swap of the 2016 multi-currency facility (Table 1).
Table 2: Structure of ESLA bonds issued in FY 2018
|
Items
|
Amount (Ghc mill)
|
Interest
|
Period
|
Comments
|
|
|
|
Target
|
Realized
|
(%)
|
(years)
|
|
|
1st Tranche
|
10
|
2,408.6
|
19.0
|
7
|
These bonds were issued together under the same market program and include refinancing of the 2016 facility for the debt on VRA & TOR balance sheets (Table …)
|
|
2nd Tranche
|
|
2,375.4
|
19.5
|
10
|
|
|
Total
|
|
4,784.0
|
|
|
|
|
SOE plus liability
|
|
9,393.5
|
|
|
|
|
Other terms/features?
|
|
||||
Table 3 summarizes the status of energy-sector debt, payments, and balances from the 2017 ESLA report. With GHc 20-to-30 billion ESLA funds to back GHc6-to-8 billion of bank debt, the state should revert to paying principal plus interest to protect depositors more. Due to the delays in 2017, the SOE and BDC debt rose from US$ … million and Ghc … in FY2016 to US$1,708 million and Ghc9353—in addition to higher foreign exchange and interest rate risks.
Table 3: Post-2018 Bond Liability, Payment and Balance Status
|
Source
|
Liability
|
Payment
|
Balance
|
Comments
|
|||
|
|
US$ m
|
Exch, rate
|
Ghc m
|
Total (Ghc m)
|
Ghc m
|
Ghc m
|
|
|
VRA
|
887.0
|
4.4
|
3,902.6
|
|
|
|
These “cedi-Bonds” (see Table ..) refinanced both foreign & domestic components of the debt under the FY2016 loan restructuring facility
|
|
|
|
|
582.8
|
4,485.4
|
2,050.1
|
2,435.3
|
|
|
TOR
|
257.8
|
4.4
|
1,134.4
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
973.4
|
2,107.8
|
775.0
|
1,332.9
|
|
|
ECG
|
424.0
|
4.4
|
1,865.5
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
318.7
|
1,664.7
|
519.5
|
1,664.7
|
|
|
BDCs
|
140.0
|
4.4
|
616.0
|
616.0
|
616.0
|
0.0
|
|
|
Total
|
1,708.8
|
|
|
9,353.5
|
3,960.6
|
5,432.9
|
|
4. THE POTENTIAL OF ESLA
Table 4 shows the ESLA rates underlying the inflows from 2016. As noted, they could remain in force for ten (10) years to support the 2017 Bonds—unless another viable source of revenue is identified to lift the burden on taxpayers.
Table 4: Energy Sector Levies and Pricing Formula
|
|
|
|
Products
|
Total
|
||||||
|
Levy
|
CollectxAgency
|
Benefactor/
Institution
|
Petrol
|
Diesel
|
Marine Gas
|
Fuel Oil
|
Kero-sine
|
LPG
|
Electricity
|
|
|
|
|
|
price per litre (ppl)
|
ppkg
|
ppkwh
|
|
||||
|
Energy Debt Recovery
|
GRA
|
|
0.41
|
0.41
|
0.03
|
0.04
|
0.37
|
0
|
0
|
1.26
|
|
o/w forex loss
|
GRA
|
EDS a/c
|
0.05
|
0.05
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.1
|
|
TOR debt
|
GRA
|
EDS a/c
|
0.08
|
0.08
|
0.03
|
0.04
|
0.04
|
|
|
0.27
|
|
Power Gen/Infra
|
GRA
|
PGISsA
|
0.28
|
0.28
|
|
|
0.28
|
|
|
0.84
|
|
Road Fund Levy
|
GRA
|
Road Fund
|
0.4
|
0.4
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.8
|
|
Energy Fund Levy
|
GRA
|
Energy Cmx
|
0.01
|
0.01
|
|
0.01
|
|
0.01
|
|
0.04
|
|
Price Stabilization
|
NPA
|
PSR a/c
|
0.12
|
0.1
|
|
|
0.1
|
|
|
0.32
|
|
Public lighting levy
|
ECG/NEDCO/VRA
|
MOP/EDCs/PGISsA
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.5%
|
0.005
|
|
National electrifx
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.5%
|
0.005
|
Source: ESLA Report (2016), Section 7, Appendix A
Table 5 shows estimates and actual inflows from the levies and are deemed to be enough to support a major restructuring of debt owed to suppliers, contractors, and counterpart banks.
Table 5: Programmed, collection, and actual 2016 ESLA performance
|
January-December 2016 (Ghc million)
|
|||||||
|
Levy
|
Collection
|
|
|
Deviation
|
|||
|
|
Program
|
Actual
|
Lodgment
|
Prog-Actual
|
Act-Lodgmt
|
% (Prog-Actual)
|
% (Act – Lodgmt)
|
|
Energy Debt Rec
|
1,174.60
|
1,281.20
|
1,264.10
|
106.60
|
(17.10)
|
9.08
|
(1.33)
|
|
Price Stabilization
|
396.40
|
338.50
|
326.30
|
(57.90)
|
(12.20)
|
(14.61)
|
(3.60)
|
|
Public Lighting
|
295.70
|
168.40
|
22.90
|
(127.30)
|
(145.50)
|
(43.05)
|
(86.40)
|
|
Nat. Electrificx
|
296.90
|
276.90
|
32.70
|
(20.00)
|
(244.20)
|
(6.74)
|
(88.19)
|
|
Road Fund
|
1,061.80
|
1,204.20
|
1,002.00
|
142.40
|
(202.20)
|
13.41
|
(16.79)
|
|
Energy Fund
|
30.90
|
29.80
|
24.70
|
(1.10)
|
(5.10)
|
(3.56)
|
(17.11)
|
|
Total
|
3,256.30
|
3,299.00
|
2,672.70
|
42.70
|
(626.30)
|
1.31
|
(18.98)
|
Source: ESLA Report (2016), Section 7, Appendix B
The ESLA law requires that MoF sets up specific accounts to manage the inflows and outflows—amended since FY2017 to include all the accounts under the ESLA law.
Tables 6 and 7 shows that there are significant deviations between the ESLA lodgments and actual utilization.
Table 6: 2016 ESLA lodgments versus utilization
|
Levy Accounts
|
Lodgment
|
Utilization
|
Deviation
|
||
|
|
GhC million
|
Nominal
|
Percent
|
||
|
1.0
|
Energy Debt Service a/c (EDSA)
|
478.0
|
311.0
|
(167.0)
|
(34.9)
|
|
1.1
|
Tema Oil Refinery (TOR) debt
|
nr
|
187.0
|
nr
|
nr
|
|
1.2
|
Forex loss
|
nr
|
124.0
|
nr
|
nr
|
|
2.0
|
Power Gen & Infra sub-a/c (PGISsA)
|
841.7
|
787.0
|
(54.7)
|
(6.5)
|
|
2.1
|
Debt payment
|
nr
|
787.0
|
nr
|
nr
|
|
2.2
|
Power supply
|
nr
|
0.0
|
nr
|
nr
|
|
2.3
|
Under–recovery
|
nr
|
0.0
|
nr
|
nr
|
|
2.4
|
PRG
|
nr
|
0.0
|
nr
|
nr
|
|
3.0
|
Price Stabex & Rec’vry a/c (PSRLA)
|
326.3
|
313.3
|
(13.0)
|
(4.0)
|
|
3.1
|
Petrol under–recovery
|
nr
|
0.0
|
nr
|
nr
|
|
3.2
|
Petrol price stabilization
|
nr
|
269.5
|
nr
|
nr
|
|
3.3
|
Premix subsidy
|
nr
|
43.8
|
nr
|
nr
|
|
|
Total utilization
|
1,646.0
|
1,411.3
|
(234.7)
|
(14.3)
|
|
Source: 2017 ESLA Report, MOF; nr (not reported)
|
|||||
As Table 7 and 8 show, the 2017 ESLA flows were also strong, given global economic recovery and firms passing the increase in crude oil prices to consumers.
Table 7: Programmed, collection, and actual 2017 ESLA performance
|
Levy
|
Nominal Amount
|
Deviation (Nominal)
|
Deviation (%)
|
||||
|
|
Program
|
Actual
|
Lodgment
|
Program – Actual
|
Actual – Lodgment
|
Program – Actual
|
Actual – Lodgmentt
|
|
EDRL
|
1,358.1
|
1,293.0
|
1,293.0
|
(65.1)
|
0.0
|
(4.8)
|
0.0
|
|
PSRL
|
415.3
|
345.3
|
345.3
|
(70.0)
|
0.0
|
(16.9)
|
0.0
|
|
PLL
|
229.0
|
180.0
|
179.7
|
(49.0)
|
(0.3)
|
(21.4)
|
(0.2)
|
|
NESL
|
189.7
|
151.1
|
151.1
|
(38.6)
|
0.0
|
(20.3)
|
0.0
|
|
RFL
|
1,331.4
|
1,152.0
|
1,058.1
|
(179.4)
|
(93.9)
|
(13.5)
|
(8.9)
|
|
EFL
|
31.9
|
30.7
|
28.1
|
(1.2)
|
(2.6)
|
(3.7)
|
(9.3)
|
|
Total
|
3,555.4
|
3,152.1
|
3,055.3
|
(403.3)
|
(96.8)
|
(80.5)
|
(18.3)
|
Source: 2017 ESLA Report, MOF
The Tables continue to exhibit the same significant deviation between collection and lodgment.
Table 8: 2017 ESLA Lodgments versus utilization
|
Levy
|
Lodgmt
|
Utilizx
|
Deviation
|
Comments
|
|||
|
|
Ghc million
|
Ghc m
|
%
|
|
|||
|
1.0
|
EDSA
|
438.9
|
228.8
|
(210.1)
|
(47.9)
|
|
|
|
1.1
|
TOR debt
|
156.8
|
181.8
|
nr
|
nr
|
|
|
|
1.2
|
Forex loss
|
282.1
|
47.0
|
nr
|
nr
|
|
|
|
2.0
|
PG&IS
|
687.5
|
919.0
|
231.5
|
33.7
|
See new item 3.0
|
|
|
2.1
|
Debt pmt
|
640.0
|
855.1
|
nr
|
nr
|
|
|
|
2.2
|
Power supply
|
19.0
|
0.0
|
nr
|
nr
|
|
|
|
2.3
|
Under–recovery
|
28,6
|
0.0
|
nr
|
nr
|
|
|
|
2.5
|
PRG
|
Na
|
61.5
|
na
|
na
|
Not in ESLA Act
|
|
|
2.6
|
Bank charges
|
Na
|
2.4
|
na
|
na
|
|
|
|
3.0
|
Trs: ESLA plc
|
Na
|
279.8
|
na
|
na
|
2017 ESLA Bond Prospectus
|
|
|
4.0
|
Price Stabex
|
345.0
|
21.7
|
21.7
|
|
|
|
|
4.1
|
Petrol underrec
|
Nr
|
0.0
|
nr
|
nr
|
|
|
|
4.2
|
Petrol px stabex
|
Nr
|
0.0
|
nr
|
nr
|
|
|
|
4.3
|
Premix subsidy
|
Nr
|
21.7
|
nr
|
nr
|
|
|
|
|
Total utilization
|
1472.3
|
1,449.3
|
43.1
|
|
|
|
|
Source: 2017 ESLA Report, MOF; nr=not reported; na=not applicable
|
|||||||
Table 9 shows additional data and inflows that are attributable to extending the coverage of reporting to all ESLA levies and the channeling of the energy debt service through ESLA plc.
5. CONCLUSION
On the 10th
anniversary of the fall of Lehman Brothers in the US, which many
experts believe to be the immediate of the global financial crisis, it
is useful to remind ourselves that ESLA is designed to resolve several fiscal, real sector, and banking challenges. While
remote causes such as the “sub-prime (rate) lending” debacle remained
in the background, the fall of Lehman Brothers raised issues relating to
idealism versus pragmatism in making public policy.
The ideal was to make Lehman fall but the contagion effect was disastrous and led to pragmatic interventions by treasuries and central banks, led by the quantitative easing measures by the US Federal Reserve and Treasury. The immediate outcome from drying global financial flows, lack of credit to business, loss of jobs, and slump in global demand for developing countries was the sharp fall in commodities prices.
It has taken a decade for the world to see simultaneous recoveries in
the economies of developing, emerging or BRIC and advanced economies.
ESLA and the refinancing of VRA’s legacy
debt was a pragmatic way of preventing the impact of the energy and
road sector debt from contagiously affecting depositors’ funds, jobs and
meltdown of the Ghanaian economy—which, in 2015, was just emerging from the energy crisis caused
by the damage of the West Africa gas pipeline and disruption in gas
supply from Nigeria, christened or nicknamed “dumsor”. It was a tripartite agreement that improved the NPL situation in twelve (12) domestic banks.
We are seeing the contrast in allowing
some banks to fall and others forced into a consolidation program. Big
is not always beautiful in this context because the global financial
crisis also coined the term “too big to fail”, when it came to the
question of allowing bigger banks than Lehman Brothers to also fall.
Already, the fiscal cost in the form of levies (ESLA) and loans has been
heavy; the impact on the real sector in job losses is also real. Given
the strong ESLA inflows, we still have an opportunity to redirect the levy to the core business of resolving the real and financial crisis.
We can do this by removing impediments such as the ESLA “cap” and mainstreaming of its flows, to focus better on the NPLs emanating from the energy, road, and other sectors. The banking sector also needs the ESLA inflows and, therefore, we must revert to paying principal plus interest for all ESLA-backed loans or bonds. This to avoid the “bullet” risk associated with the 2007 Sovereign Bond and use of the Sinking Fund to pay over US$500 million of petroleum revenue between 2014 and 2017 to redeem the maturing US$750 million debt.
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